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FEDERAL JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
TO SANTA FE INDUSTRIES, INC. V. GREEN
THOMAS J. SHERRARD*
I. Introduction
For more than a decade prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green' in 1977, the judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5
to include violations of fiduciary responsibility proceeded at an ever in-
creasing pace. 2 Indeed, by the time the Second Circuit delivered its expan-
sive reading of Rule 10b-5 in Santa Fe,3 there already existed a long line
of cases, particularly in the Second Circuit, which led to the almost ines-
capable conclusion that "fraud" under the Rule unquestionably encom-
passed fiduciary breaches in connection with a securities transaction.' In
Santa Fe Judge Medina writing for the Second Circuit outlined the
breadth of Rule 10b-5 in remedying corporate mismanagement:
[In such cases [as Santa Fe] misrepresentation or lack of disclo-
sure are not essential ingredients of the claim for relief by the
minority. But, lest there be any lingering doubt on this point, we
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. Duke University, 1966; J.D.,
University of Florida, 1969. Member of Tennessee, Georgia and Florida Bars. I wish to ac-
knowledge and express my appreciation for the valuable contribution of Charles E. Gerdts
in the preparation of this Article.
1 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
2 For a general analysis of these developments, see Jacobs, The Role of Securities Ex-
change Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 27
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs]; Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibilities in the Management
of the Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw 883 (1976); Sherrard, Fiduciaries and Fairness Under Rule
10b-5, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1385 (1976).
1 Green v: Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). An even more expansive opinion regarding Rule 10b-5 was rendered by another panel
of the Second Circuit at the same time. In Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir.), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976), the court
held that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty existed under Rule 10b-5 despite prior
full and fair disclosure.
See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972); Drachman v. Harvey, 453
F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See also Travis v. Anthes
Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
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now hold that in such cases, including the one now before us, no
allegation or proof of misrepresentation or non-disclosure is neces-
sary .... We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule
10b-5 when it charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form
merger, that the majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary
duties to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the
merger without any justifiable business purpose.5
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Following the mode of
analysis used in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores' and Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,7 the Court declared that the language of Section 10(b)
must control any interpretation of Rule 10b-5, and "[tihe language of
§10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not
involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to any evi-
dence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the
language of the statute."' Because the allegations of the complaint con-
tained no reference to misrepresentation or nondisclosure, the Court re-
fused to recognize a federal cause of action. Furthermore, the statute's
reference to manipulation was held by the Court to refer to practices "in-
tended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity."9
Manipulation, the Court declared, was a "term of art" and was to be given
a very restricted interpretation."
The Court could have disposed of Sante Fe with only the above analy-
sis, but the majority went further to offer additional reasons for denying
application of Rule 10b-5 to the facts. Since Congress did not expressly
grant a private cause of action under Section 10(b), the Court reasoned
that a private right of action should be implied only in special circumstan-
ces when it is absolutely necessary to fulfill a perceived congressional pur-
pose behind the statute in question. The avowed purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is that of disclosure; the Court suggested that fair-
ness is at best only a tangential concern." Additionally, the Court recog-
nized that although breaches of fiduciary duties in the corporate setting
have traditionally been within the ambit of state law, the existence of a
state remedy should never preclude a cause of action under federal law.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that the ambivalence of Section 10(b) with
respect to fairness claims made it perfectly appropriate to consider ques-
tions of federalism in determining whether or not to expand the scope of
Rule 10b-5.12 In a broad sense, the import of the Santa Fe decision was
unmistakably clear: without proof of deception or manipulation, breaches
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1976).
6 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
7 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
'430 U.S. at 473.
Id. at 477.
10 Id. at 476.
" Id. at 478.
12 Id. at 478-79.
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of fiduciary responsibility, no matter how egregious, are not a matter of
federal concern.
One of the primary purposes of this article is to test the soundness of
the Santa Fe holding. Decisions by the lower federal courts subsequent to
the Santa Fe opinion suggest that to some degree fiduciary duties are not
irrelevant in allowing a federal cause of action under Rule 10b-5.13 The
Supreme Court actually left this question open in Santa Fe by failing to
define "deception."" As will be discussed below, the lower federal courts
have focused upon this lack of definition and have resurrected an earlier
judicial interpretation of deception, first announced by the Second Circuit
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.'5
The Securities and Exchange Commission also has responded to the
Santa Fe decision in an innovative manner. The Santa Fe decision by the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of relying upon statutory lan-
guage. This approach, while limiting the application of Rule 10b-5, argua-
bly will permit a more expansive application of other sections under the
federal securities law where the express statutory language may be suscep-
tible to a broader reading. In proposing a new going private rule,'" the SEC
appears to have justified its regulatory reach upon the very rationale uti-
lized by the Supreme Court. Whether such an administrative interpreta-
tion can be justified also will be discussed.
Finally, implicit in the Santa Fe decision is a challenge to the state
courts and legislatures to rise to the occasion and deal adequately with
breaches of fiduciary duties in the corporate setting. Commentators have
for years decried the lamentable protection offered to minority sharehold-
ers under state statutory and case law.'" Undeniably, a major reason for
the expanded application of Rule 10b-5 over the last decade especially in
the area of what has become known as "corporate mismanagement," has
been the inability of the states to provide easy access to the courts and
adequate relief in many cases involving misconduct by corporate fiduciar-
ies. Whether the states will react positively to the challenge of Santa Fe is
an interesting question, although beyond the scope of the article. At pres-
ent, except for Delaware, no state court has responded specifically to the
Santa Fe decision."8 The fact that the case is little more than a year old
"Bee text accompanying notes 41-60 infra.
" Although the Court failed to define "deception," the Court did define "manipulation"
as "practices ... intended to mislead investors by arbitrarily affecting market activity." 430
U.S. at 476.
is 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), reu'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215, cert. denied sub nom., Manley
v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see text accompanying notes 29-40 infia.
" See Proposed Rule 13e-3, reprinted in [19771 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,703A, SEC
Securities Act Release No. 34-14185 (Nov. 17, 1977) (see text accompanying notes 113-43
infra).
11 The most notable recent comment on the status of shareholder protection under state
law is Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
1 The Delaware Supreme Court, in two cases decided after Santa Fe, apparently has
decided to take a more active role in regulating corporate fiduciary behavior particularly in
1978]
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undoubtedly accounts for the dearth of state court decisions. Thus, the
analysis of Santa Fe's impact on state law must await further develop-
ments.
II. The Federal Judiciary's Response-Toward a New Theory of
Disclosure
A. Development Prior to Santa Fe
Although the rule enunciated in Santa Fe expressly applies to the entire
spectrum of transactions that fall under Rule 10b-5, the opinion does not
discuss insider trading, misleading corporate publicity or market manipu-
lation as such. Instead, the opinion addresses a line of judicial precedent
which has dealt with certain kinds of misconduct in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities generally referred to as internal corporate
mismanagement." One reason for the special focus in Santa Fe is the
problem of applying a uniform deception test in corporate mismanagement
cases arising under Rule 10b-5. On the one hand, a basic deception stan-
dard has proved capable of rather consistent application in the insider
trading, market manipulation, and corporate publicity contexts where dis-
a merger "squeeze-out" situation. In Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977),
the court held that although the Delaware merger statute seemed to provide an exclusive
appraisal remedy to minority shareholders objecting to a squeeze-out merger, the majority
shareholders must have a bona fide business purpose for the merger and must treat the
minority with "entire fairness." In Singer, the court clearly recognized the problems involved
in going private and essentially imposed common law fiduciary principles upon what was
thought to be a self-contained statutory scheme. In a footnote, the court discussed the then-
recently decided Santa Fe decision, stating that "Santa Fe is a current confirmation by the
Supreme Court of the responsibility of a State to govern the internal affairs of corporate life."
Id. at 976. The Singer court then stated that "[C]orporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to shareholders,
state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Id., citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975). Thus, it is clear that the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the significance
of Santa Fe and probably responded to it. In Tanzer v. International General Indus., Inc.,
379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), the court elaborated on the valid business purpose requirement,
holding that the purpose advanced may solely benefit the majority shareholder. See also
Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977); see generally Note, Assuring Fairness in
Corporate Mergers: Recent State Trends, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv., .927 (1978).
" Internal corporate mismanagement has been characterized as the third major classifi-
cation of Rule 10b-5 cases, the others being insider trading and corporate publicity. Although
the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952) found it inappropriate to apply Rule lob-5 to claims that involved
traditional allegations of mismanagement by corporate fiduciaries, the succeeding decades
witnessed a reversal of this position culminating in the Second Circuit's holding in Santa Fe.
The Supreme Court, however, in rejecting the Second Circuit's approach in Santa Fe, did
not renounce its position, taken in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971), that claims of corporate mismanagement touching the purchase or sale of a
security were not immune from the grasp of Rule lOb-5. For a discussion of this developing
area see Jacobs, supra note 2. A discussion of the impact of Santa Fe upon corporate misman-
agement may be found in Jacobs, How Santa Fe Affects lOb-5's Proscriptions Against Corpo-
rate Mismanagement, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 3 (1978).
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closure of material facts and the absence of manipulation generally assures
equal footing and an informed choice on both sides of the securities trans-
actions. In these market transactions, the party to whom a duty of non-
deceptive or non-manipulative conduct is owed is usually easy to deter-
mine. However, applying a consistent rule of deception in the corporate
mismanagement cases has proved to be a more difficult problem.
The difficulty in applying a uniform rule of deception results from the
nature of misconduct viewed as corporate mismanagement and from the
very concept of the corporate entity. As an artificial person, the corpora-
tion must act only through shareholders, directors or their agents depend-
ing ipon state statutes, articles of incorporation, and bylaws. Indeed, un-
like the principal in a typical agency relationship, the corporation can
never enjoy the luxury of bypassing the agent and acting on its own behalf.
Logically, then, the corporation can only be deceived if the appropriate
"decision-making body," as determined by state law and internal corpo-
rate procedures, itself is deceived." If state corporate law declares that
certain transactions need only be approved by the board of directors of the
corporation, then any duty to disclose logically should run to the members
of the board. Likewise, if state law requires that mergers be approved by
the shareholders of the corporation, any duty to make full and fair disclo-
sure under federal or state law exists in favor of the shareholders, the
appropriate decision-making body.
The above guidelines for applying a deception rule in corporate mis-
management cases are difficult to apply when a breach of fiduciary respon-
sibility by the board of directors causes harm to the corporation. Assume,
for example, that a securities transaction requires only board approval and
that a majority of all of the board of directors have interests which conflict
with those of the corporation, thus making it impossible for the corporation
to receive the independent, disinterested judgment of the board members
to which it is entitled. The issue raised by such a factual situation is
whether, if the directors act to benefit themselves and harm the corpora-
tion, such conduct can be construed as "deception" of the corporation for
purposes of applying Rule 10b-5. A pair of cases decided by the Second
Circuit in 1964 illustrates the two basic approaches that can be taken to
resolve this question. In Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.21 a three-judge
panel found that the corporation had been a victim of deception because
all but one of the directors, acting to perpetuate their control of the corpo-
ration, had concealed material facts about a securities transaction from the
remaining director. The court had little difficulty in characterizing this
active concealment of material facts from one director as deception of the
corporation in a traditional sense,2 although one might suggest that if the
21 Discussion of "decisionmaking body" may be found in Fleischer, "Federal Corporation
Law": An Assessment, 78 HAIv. L. REV. 1146, 1163 (1965); Note, The Controlling Influence
Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HAy. L. REV., 1007, 1026 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as The Controlling Influence Standard].
21 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
22 Id. at 29.
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transaction could have been approved by a majority of the board, then only
.the majority need be fully informed, and nondisclosure or misrepresen-
tation to other board members would not amount to deception of the
corporation. More importantly, the court, in dictum, suggested that a
corporation could be deceived even though the entire board is fully in-
formed if all the directors have an interest adverse to that of the corpora-
tion.Y Less than four weeks after the Ruckle decision a different panel
within the Second Circuit approved the Ruckle holding but rejected the
dictum. In O'Neill v. Maytag,2 4 the court held that although the corpora-
tion may have been harmed by the efforts of all the directors to protect
their positions at the expense of the corporation, all the directors were
nonetheless fully informed. Thus the court held that the allegations pre-
sented "no serious claim of deceit" which was necessary to invoke Rule
10b-5.2
The analytical battle lines were drawn by these two decisions. The
rationale of O'Neill is two pronged. First, the court seems to have con-
cluded that if the thrust of Rule 10b-5 depends upon the nature of the
conduct rather than its harmful effect, then the entity cannot be deceived
in the traditional sense if none of its directors were deceived. Second, the
O'Neill panel appears to have adopted a somewhat narrow construction of
the traditional agency rule that the knowledge of an agent will be imputed
to the principal.25 Since the transaction was disclosed fully to all directors,
the directors' knowledge was imputed to the corporate entity and thus the
corporation could not have been deceived.
The dictum in Ruckle may be distinguished from the O'Neill holding
in two respects. First, the Ruckle dictum finds support from an exception
to the agency rule apparently relied upon by O'Neill. That exception holds
that the knowledge of an agent, (director), although customarily imputed
to the principal (corporation), will not be so imputed if the agent is acting
adversely to the interest of the principal.2 Secondly, the dictum in Ruckle
suggests that the court utilized a result-oriented analysis. In essence, the
court reasoned that the harm to the corporation is the same whether or not
traditional deception was involved.3
The traditional, restrictive approach of O'Neill v. Maytag was short-
lived even in the Second Circuit. In 1968, in the en banc decision of
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook," the court clearly approved the dictum in
Ruckle. Schoenbaum was a derivative action in which Aquitaine Company
23 Id.
24 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
" Id. at 767.
1, See RFsrATEME T (SEcoND) OF AGENcY §268 (1958).
' Id. at §282.
2A result-oriented approach to the application of Rule 10b-5 was employed by many
courts and the SEC prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Ernst & Ernst
rejected such an approach, holding instead that the nature of the conduct must be empha-
sized. Id. at 197.
2 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
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of Canada, Ltd., the controlling shareholder of Banff Oil, Ltd., was
charged with using its control to cause an issuance of a large block of
treasury stock to itself at an unreasonably low price." The price was alleg-
edly unfair because at the time of the transaction Aquitaine possessed
inside information about a substantial oil discovery which, if made public,
would have vastly increased the value of the treasury shares sold to it. The
court held that the plaintiff could establish a cause of action under Rule
10b-5 if he showed that the defendant exercised a "controlling influence"
over the entire board of directors which prevented the directors from exer-
cising their independent, disinterested judgment in approving the issuance
of stock .3'Most importantly for our purposes, the Schoenbaum court also
stated an alternative theory for its ruling: "Aquitaine and the directors of
Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than Aqui-
taine)."3
Decisions in other circuits soon adopted what came to be known as the
"controlling influence" test of Schoenbaum. Perhaps the rationale behind
the controlling influence test was most persuasively stated by the Fifth
Circuit in Shell v. Hensley. 3
When the other party to the securities transaction controls the
judgment of all the corporation's board members or conspires with
them or the one controlling them to profit mutually at the expense
of the corporation, the corporation is no less disabled from availing
itself of an informed judgment than if the outsider had simply lied
to the board. In both situations the determination of the corpora-,
tion's choice of action in the transaction in question is not made-
as a reasonable man would make it if possessed of all the material
information known to the party to the transaction.,
Despite such attempts to equate controlling influence with deception, the
analogy is not totally convincing. Indeed, the controlling influence test
might be characterized more accurately as rejecting the traditional decep-
tion rationale of earlier cases and creating liability purely for breach of
fiduciary duty.
The alternate holding of Schoenbaum, declaring that the defendants'
conduct constituted deception of the independent shareholders, was based
' Id. at 218.
" Id. at 219-20.
3" Id. at 220.
4 See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Swanson
v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967). This test was characterized as the "new fraud" by many
commentators. See, e.g., Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act
and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969); Patrick, Rule 10b-5, Equitable Fraud and
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 21 ALA. L. Rav. 457 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. Rv. 1103 (1969).
34 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
uId. at 827.
1978]
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on an earlier opinion by the Third Circuit in Pappas v. Moss.3" On facts
quite similar to Schoenbaum, the Pappas court stated that "deception
. . . [could be] . . . fairly found by viewing this fraud as though the
'independent' stockholders were standing in the place of the defrauded
corporate entity .... "
It seems clear that the language in Pappas is quite different from pre-
vious rationales employed to impose Rule 10b-5 liability in conflict of
interest transactions. The Pappas court undeniably spoke of deception in
the traditional sense. But in order to find traditional deception, the court
was compelled to create a duty to disclose to the shareholders. Prior to the
Pappas decision, however, it was understood that since the shareholders
were not empowered with decision-making authority in such situations,
they were not entitled to any disclosure. If no duty of disclosure ran to the
independent shareholders, logically they would have no right to claim they
had been deceived. By declaring that the independent stockholders were
in reality the deceived parties, the opinions in Pappas and Schoenbaum
seem to be arguing that the formal requirements imposed upon decision-
making bodies within the corporation should give way to a realistic ap-
praisal of the circumstances. After all, how else would a corporation be able
to protect itself from harm inflicted by self-dealing insiders?
The most significant aspect of this new analysis of deception is that it
can be viewed as imposing a duty upon insiders to make full and fair
disclosure to independent shareholders in all situations where self-dealing
or conflicting interests on the part of the board of directors may bring harm
to the corporation, even though state law or internal corporate policies
otherwise would not require such disclosure. Unfortunately, the decisions
in the federal courts subsequent to Schoenbaum failed to develop this new
theory of disclosure. Rather than adopt the initial holding of Schoenbaum,
these later cases tended instead to adopt the initial holding in
Schoenbaum, a test that was heralded as the "new fraud" under Rule 10b-
5.38
Since the controlling influence test is grounded essentially in a breach
of fiduciary responsibility, the test appears clearly to have been overruled
by the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe.9 More than a mere con-
trolling influence and a breach of fiduciary duty is required to impose lia-
bility under Rule 10b-5. It is not entirely clear, however, that the Santa
Fe opinion also rejected the alternative holding in Schoenbaum, since the
alternative rationale was based on a finding of deception, albeit by creating
a new duty of disclosure to shareholders. Subsequent to the decision in
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968).
3' Id. at 869.
See note 33 supra.
3' Judge Friendly concluded as much in Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1249 (1978) when he assumed that "in light of the decision in [Santa
Fe] the existence of 'controlling influence' and 'wholly inadequate consideration'-an aspect
of the Schoenbaum decision that perhaps attracted more attention. . .- can no longer alone
form the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability . . . . " Id. at 217.
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Santa Fe several lower federal court decisions have held that the new
deception theory developed in Schoenbaum was not overruled by Santa
Fe.40 These decisions by necessity have embellished this novel theory of
disclosure, thus raising a number of questions about the nature and the
extent of this new duty imposed on insiders to make potentially wide-
ranging disclosures to shareholders.
B. Goldberg v. Meridor and the Scope of the Duty to Disclose
This new theory of deception, recognized first by Pappas and
Schoenbaum, was most clearly articulated by Judge Friendly in the Sec-
ond Circuit case of Goldberg v. Meridor."1 In Goldberg, a minority share-
holder of Universal Gas & Oil Company, Inc. (UGO) brought a derivative
suit against the directors of UGO, the controlling parent corporations, and
the investment banking and accounting firms involved in a transaction
which was allegedly unfair to the corporation.2 Goldberg complained that
in 1972 the defendants caused UGO to make a public offering of common
stock and convertible debentures, and represented that the proceeds from
the offering would be employed to finance the construction and purchase
of three tankers for the transportion of liquified gas and that thereafter
UGO would be engaged in the transportation of liquified gas. In 1974 the
defendants, through the board of directors of UGO, allegedly forced the
company to sell two of the vessels for $25 million, thereby realizing a profit
of $14 million. In August 1975, the defendants, again through the UGO
board of directors, caused the company to loan $7 million to its controlling
parent, Maritimecor, S.A., a Panamanian-corporation. 3-Apparently, at
the time of the loan Maritimercor's liabilities exceeded its assets. Within
the same month, the defendants caused UGO to enter into an agreement
with Maritimecor which provided that UGO would acquire all the parent's
assets and assume all its liabilities, including the debt owed to UGO, in
return for more than four million shares of UGO's stock. The plaintiff
further claimed that the defendant directors had reason to believe that the
transaction was unfair to UGO since the net asset value of Maritimecor
bore no relation to the value of the UGO stock that was exchanged." The
plaintiff alleged that as a result of this transaction, UGO defaulted on its
obligations and that its major assets had been seized by creditors.
The district court considered Goldberg while Santa Fe was still pending
before the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the district court refused to apply
the Second Circuit's holding in Santa Fe, declaring that the Second Cir-
cuit's holding was limited to going private transactions." The trial court
then dismissed Goldberg's complaint, stating that it failed to set forth a
:' See text accompanying notes 41-60 infra.
It 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
2 Id. at 211.
SId.
" Id.
4 Goldberg v. Meridor, 426 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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cause of action under Rule 10b-5 because it failed to allege any form of
deceit."
On appeal, the Second Circuit treated the case as if the plaintiff had.
amended the complaint to include allegations of deceit. 7 In effect, the
allegations were that the minority shareholders of UGO had been deceived
by certain misrepresentations and concealments relating to the transac-
tions. This novel theory of deception was necessary since the facts of the
case indicated that all or nearly all the directors of UGO had been fully
informed of the nature and impact of the transactions.4" Because Panama-
nian law only required approval by the board of directors, the traditional
argument could be made that the corporation was not deceived because
the relevant decision-making body had the benefit of full disclosure." The
court rejected this traditional argument, however, declaring instead that
the real parties in interest, the minority shareholders, had been deceived
because the nature of the transaction had been misrepresented to them.
The court then specifically adopted the alternative holding in Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook0
Having determined that the alternative ruling in Schoenbaum would
control in the Second Circuit, the Goldberg court then determined whether
the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe precluded the application of
such a rule. Judge Friendly answered in the negative.' Admitting that the
existence of a controlling influence by any shareholder coupled with unfair-
ness to the corporation or the minority in a given transaction alone would
not form the basis for liability under Rule 10b-5, the court held that such
liability would indeed be found "when the corporation is influenced by its
controlling shareholder to engage in a transaction adverse to the corpora-
tion's interest (in effect, the minority shareholders' interest) and there is
nondisclosure or misleading disclosure as to the material facts of the trans-
action." 52 Moreover, Judge Friendly took comfort in certain language in
Santa Fe which not only appeared implicitly to approve the alternative
holding in Schoenbaum, but also suggested that the Supreme Court in-
tended in Santa Fe to define deception in the broadest possible terms. 3
46 Id. at 1064.
5' 67 F.2d at 213.
The Court of Appeals noted that, upon discovery, one of UGO's directors had claimed
he had been deceived or at least had not received full disclosure of the facts surrounding the
transaction. Id. Of course, if this allegation had been made, Judge Friendly arguably could
have grounded the opinion on the prior holding of Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d
24 (2d Cir. 1964), where the allegation claimed that one member of the board had been
deceived.
" 567 F.2d at 222 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
405 F.2d at 220.
, 567 F.2d at 217-18.
52 Id. at 217.
See 430 U.S. at 474-75 n. 15 (1977). In Goldberg Judge Friendly argued:
It was because "the complaint failed to allege a material misrepresentation or
material failure to disclose" that the Court found "inapposite the cases [including
Schoenbaum] relied upon by respondents and the court below, in which the
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Whether or not the principles enunciated in Goldberg were sanctioned
by the Santa Fe opinion is somewhat speculative since Justice White's
language in Santa Fe is decidedly vague on the issue of deception. It seems
fair to observe that Judge Friendly's interpretation of Santa Fe may well
be correct, especially since the Supreme Court chose not to review the
Goldberg decision." More significant, given the likelihood that the
Goldberg rule will be adopted by other courts, is the creation of a new set
of responsibilities under federal law to be imposed upon controlling share-
holders and directors. Unquestionably, Goldberg imposes a duty of disclo-
sure upon controlling shareholders and directors which appears to extend
directly to all independent shareholders. Unfortunately, the opinions fails
to analyze completely the many problems raised.
In Wright v. Heizer Corp.,55 the Seventh Circuit adopted a rule of
disclosure similar to the holding in Goldberg." In Wright, International
Digisonics Corp. (IDC) was a closely held corporation organized to develop
a process for the electronic monitoring of television commercials. Seeking
a sizeable capital contribution from a private investor as a preliminary
step to going public, IDC entered into an arrangement with Heizer, a
venture capital corporation, whereby Heizer made loans to IDC of substan-
tial sums and also invested in equity securities of IDC.57
The intended public offering did not take place as scheduled, and, over
a period of several years, Heizer found itself extending greater amounts of
funds to IDC in order to keep it afloat. Over that period, Heizer's position
changed from that of a creditor with a limited amount of equity interest
to that of controlling shareholder of IDG 8
The crux of the plaintiff's complaint was that Heizer, in dealing with
IDC, utilized its position of control to obtain benefits detrimental to IDC.
Moreover, the plaintiffs complained that Heizer, as a controlling share-
holder, had a duty to disclose the material facts concerning the self-dealing
transactions to the minority and that failure to make disclosure consti-
breaches of fiduciary duty held violative of Rule 10b-5 included some element of
deception" [citation omitted]. While appellant is wrong in saying that the Court
"approved" these cases, there is no indication that the Court would have casually
overturned such an impressive and unanimous body of decisions by courts of ap-
peals. To the contrary, the Court used rather benign language about them, saying
that they "forcefully reflect the principle that '[slection 10(b) must be read flexi-
bly not restrictively' and that the statute provides a cause of action for any plaintiff
who 'suffer[s] an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale [or
purchase] of securities ..
Id. at 218.
11 The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Meridor v. Goldberg, 98 S.
Ct. 1249 (1978).
560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977).
In Wright, the court stated that "[w]hen an entire board of directors is controlled by
a self-dealing director or shareholder the corporation can only be represented by the indepen-
dent shareholders to whom full disclosure must be made." 560 F.2d at 249.
" Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242-44.
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tuted deception for purposes of Rule 10b-5. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the plaintiffs, holding that a duty rested upon the controlling share-
holder and upon the directors to make full disclosure of all material facts
to the independent shareholders. 51 In this case, as in Goldberg, the analysis
of the many issues raised by the creation of a federal obligation to disclose
was not complete."
C. Ramifications of the Theory
Widespread adoption of this new duty of disclosure should concern the
management of nearly every corporation, large or small, publicly or closely
held. When does a duty to disclose occur? What must be disclosed? How
and to whom must disclosure be made? What defenses are available and
how will they be applied? These and related questions are dealt with
below.
1. When Does the Duty Arise?
The initial question when applying this new rule of disclosure is when
and under what circumstances will the duty to disclose arise. Insofar as
controlling shareholders are concerned, the Seventh Circuit declared in
Wright that no duty is created until the shareholder acquires control over
the corporation:
In the first three transactions Heizer was a lender to, and share-
holder of, a corporation that it did not control and on whose board
it was not represented. We may assume that as such it was entitled
to act solely in its own interest in dealing with IDC's management,
whose responsibility it was to advise the shareholders. By the time
of the fourth transaction, however, Heizer had gained voting con-
trol of IDC and had placed two of its officers on IDC's board of
directors. Thus it stood in a fiduciary position and could no longer
act for itself alone. When Heizer chose to continue its participation
in communications to the IDC shareholders, it owed them the duty
of full disclosure . . ..
The above quotation has the familiar ring of many state fiduciary duty
cases dealing with controlling shareholders."2 Control is the condition pre-
cedent to imposing a duty to disclose upon the shareholder, and control in
" Id. at 247-48.
,' The lower court decisions in the Third Circuit, however, have refused to follow
Goldberg. See, e.g., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 446 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Tyco Lab.,
Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F.Supp. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
" 560 F.2d at 248.
62 The fiduciary responsibility of a controlling shareholder to the corporation and minor-
ity shareholders has long been recognized under state law. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson
& Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Kavanaugh
v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
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this instance undoubtedly means control over the board of directors. Deter-
mining whether shareholder control exists will require a factual inquiry
although in most cases control should be easily determined since the share-
holder will have nominated the majority, if not all, of the board of direc-
tors. Yet control may be construed more broadly, as where the directors of
a corporation, perhaps intially independent, fall under the control and
influence of a particular shareholder. In this instance, the power to control
is no less real even though the shareholder did not elect or was not able to
elect a majority of directors.
In addition to imposing a disclosure obligation upon controlling share-
holders, the decisions impose a similar obligation on directors who act to
benefit themselves or a controlling shareholder to the detriment of the
corporation and the minority shareholders. Since the directors have par-
ticipated in the wrong being done to the corporation, the duty upon them
to disclose to the independent shareholders should be no less than that
imposed upon the self-dealing shareholders. In the Schoenbaum opinion,
the Second Circuit expressly declared that, if the alleged facts were true,
the directors were guilty of deceiving the independent shareholders.63
Whether or not a controlling shareholder is involved, the federal duty
imposed by Goldberg to disclose the facts of a transaction to the indepen-
dent shareholders at the very least requires a finding that all or a majority
of the board of directors were tainted with a conflict of interest, thus
compromising their responsibility to the corporate entity. Two additional
questions exist. First, it is not clear from the opinions whether the conflict-
ing interest on the part of the directors must be pecuniary in nature. In
other words, does the federal duty of disclosure depend upon whether the
directors are to receive some kind of financial gain from their breach of
fiduciary duty? A second question is whether this duty of disclosure to the
independent shareholders depends upon a finding that the entire board of
directors has breached its fiduciary responsibility. Will the same obligation
exist where the breach is by less than all?
As to the first question, whether the conflict of interest may be pecuni-
ary in nature, the decisions after Santa Fe are not in agreement. The
Goldberg opinion does not address this point directly, but the facts suggest
that a mere division of loyalities on behalf of the board of directors is
sufficient to create a duty to disclose to independent shareholders. 4 This
405 F.2d at 220.
" Although the controlling parent, Maritimecor, stood to gain financially from the trans-
action in question, 567 F.2d at 217, the defendant directors had no apparent pecunicary
interest in the transaction. Instead, the directors' breach of duty apparently resulted from a
desire to promote the interests of the parent at the expense of its subsidiary.
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result was also implicit in the en banc opinion in Schoenbaum" where the
facts indicated that although the controlling shareholders stood to gain
financially from the transaction, the directors apparently did not share this
opportunity . In addition, the opinion in Wright 7 is silent as to what
constitutes a conflict of interest, although the facts indicate that the inter-
ested directors did not stand to realize financial gain from the transac-
tion.
6 8
Some state law decisions have observed that the term "interested direc-
tor" for purposes of fiduciary breaches is a director who stands to benefit
financially from the transaction.69 Several federal decisions after Santa Fe
have likewise held that a director is disinterested so long as he receives no
pecuniary gain from the transaction he approves. 70 Of course, a finding that
the directors are disinterested ultimately means that no duty of disclosure
to the independent shareholders will be imposed beause the corporation
presumable had the benefit of the independent, reasoned judgment of the
board. In Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Kimball,71 the district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania distinguished Goldberg and Pappas
solely on the ground that the directors received no financial gain from their
conduct. In that decision, two corporations, whose attempt to take over a
third company, Leeds, had failed because of allegedly improper conduct
by the directors of Leeds, claimed that the directors had defrauded the
independent minority shareholders. The complaint alleged that the entire
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). "
Indeed, in the panel opinion in Schoenbaum not only were the directors not in a
position to gain financially from the transaction, but the directors who actually approved the
sale of treasury shares to Aquitaine were not even nominees of Aquitaine. 405 F.2d at 212.
" 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977).
In Wright, the controlling shareholder's financial interest was directed toward de-
manding and receiving allegedly greater than necessary collateral security for obligations due
it. The directors, of whom only two of seven were nominees of the controlling shareholder,
apparently had no reason to expect personal pecuniary gain from the transaction they ap-
proved. 560 F.2d at 243, 248.
,1 In Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508, 199 A.2d 548 (1964), the court observed:
To say that the burden of proof is upon the defendants is not to indicate, however,
that the directors have the same "self-dealing interest" as is present, for example,
when a director sells property to the corporation. The only clear pecuniary interest
shown on the record was held by Mr. Cheff, as an executive of the corporation, and
Trenkamp, as its attorney. The mere fact that some of the other directors were
substantial shareholders does not create a personal pecuniary interest in the deci-
sions made by the board of directors, since all shareholders would presumably share
the benefit flowing to the substantial shareholder .... Accordingly, these direc-
tors other than Trenkamp and Cheff, while called upon to justify their actions, will
not be held to the same standard of proof required of those directors having personal
and pecuniary interest in the transaction.
Id. at 554-55. See also The Controlling Influence Standard, supra note 20, at 1037-38.
"' District court opinions in both the Second and Third Circuits have held that federal
law should apply only in cases where the directors have a pecunicary interest in the transac-
tion. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F.Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Falkenberg v. Bald-
win, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. S.c. L. REP. (CCH) 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tyco
Lab., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F.Supp 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
7, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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board of directors, led by two inside directors, who clearly wished to per-
petuate their control over the company, thwarted the plaintiffs' take-over
of control by authorizing the sale of a large block of Leeds' stock to a third
party.72 The sale of stock was allegedly at an unfair price since it was less
than the plaintiffs would have paid for the shares and less than their fair
market value.
7 3
The focus of the trial court's opinion was upon those directors other
than the two inside directors. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that these outside
directors had breached their fiduciary duty in approving the stock sale
because their real purpose was to perpetuate their membership on the
board of Leeds, and thus their control over the company.
Following the traditional approach, the district court recognized that
the appropriate decision-making body in this instance was the board of
directors, and, since all the directors presumably had full knowledge of the
material facts in question, the corporation could not have been deceived.75
The plaintiffs contended that the conflict of interest on the part of the
entire board imposed upon them the duty to make full disclosure of the
material facts of the transaction to the shareholders. The district court
refused to accept this argument. Relying on the rationale of Santa Fe, the
court declared that ample state law remedies were available to protect the
plaintiffs from such conduct of the directors.76 Goldberg and Pappas were
distinguished on the grounds that the directors of Leeds did not receive
financial benefits as a result of their approval of the transaction.77Accord-
ing to the court, an allegation that the directors of the company had acted
merely to preserve their control could not be sufficient to invoke Rule
10b-5 under the deception rationale of Goldberg.5
Pragmatically, it is difficult to understand the distinction made by the
court in Tyco. In fact, the court has created a presumption that directors
who stand to gain financially will compromise their independent judgment
but that benefits of a nonfinancial nature are presumably insufficient to
sway the ordinary director from acting in the best interest of the corpora-
7" Id. at 294-95.
7 Id. at 294.
1' Id. at 296-97.
73 Id.
76 Id. at 298.
7 The Tyco court stated that "the directors' interest in retaining control is not a suffi-
cient interest to permit this court to change the formula." 444 F. Supp. at 298. The court
relied on Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which reached the same result because the "control interest may
be attributed universally to directors and officers of corporations [and] to decide otherwise
would allow a wide variety of claims for breach of fiduciary duty to be brought under Section
10(b)." 444 F. Supp. at 298.
"I Interestingly, the Tyco court expressed some doubt whether after Santa Fe a Section
10(b) cause of action is stated at all "when the directors of a corporation, in order to enhance
their financial position, take actions to cause the corporation to enter an unfair or unfavorable
transaction and fail to disclose or misstate the purpose behind the transaction." 444 F. Supp.
at 297. Apparently, the court construed Santa Fe's reference to Schoenbaum and similar cases
as a possible disapproval of that line of authority. Cf. note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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tion. Of course, the compromise of the director's independent judgment
will not occur in every conflict of interest transaction. On the other hand,
it is quite likely that the persuasiveness of the controlling shareholder or
the desire fo continue as a director may have more influence over a director
than the possibility of financial gain. Presumptions as to courses of con-
duct may be necessary if they can be justified, but the presumption created
by the Tyco court as well as by other state and federal courts does not
appear on its face to be justifiable. 9
A second issue raised by the imposition of a new duty to disclose to
independent shareholders is whether the duty arises when less than all the
directors of a corporation have comprised their independent judgment. In
Goldberg, the entire board of directors apparently was aware of the adverse
effects of the transaction." Two other recent cases, however, have held
that if a majority of the board of directors has breached a duty of loyalty,
there is an obligation to disclose to the independent shareholders." This
analysis assumes that in cases where a majority does have a conflict of
interest but where a minority of the board are independent, the minority
directors are nonetheless impotent to represent the best interests of the
corporation and the minority shareholders. Of course, if the disinterested
minority directors have in fact been deceived by the interested majority,
a more traditional deception argument may be applied, as was done in
Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.2 But if the minority group has received full
disclosure, is it necessary to require disclosure to shareholders? An alterna-
tive would be to impose a duty upon those independent minority directors
to take such action as would be necessary to protect a corporation and thus
the independent shareholders. Indeed, inaction by a minority director on
such a case may be deemed negligence. Of course, where the entire board
of directors has a conflict of interest, the only alternative would be to
require disclosure to the shareholders of the material facts surrounding the
transaction.13
2. The Mechanics of Disclosure
Once it is established that a duty of disclosure exists in favor of inde-
pendent minority shareholders when a majority of the board of directors
is interested in a transaction, we are faced with a more difficult question
of determining what precisely must be disclosed in order to avoid liability
under Rule 10b-5. From a practical standpoint this question will be of
greatest concern to corporate managers. Assuming arguendo that corporate
11 Although the presumption adopted by the Tyco court may be unjustified as a hard
rule, the judgment of an officer or director could be more easily compromised by the promise
of personal financial gain than for other reasons. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199
A.2d 548, note 69 supra.
0 567 F.2d at 219.
ml Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Maldonado v. Flynn, [Current]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,356 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1978).
12 See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
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managers will always know when a conflict of interest exists, what must
the shareholders be told? Must they be informed that a breach of duty has
occurred or is likely to happen? It seems fanciful to believe that insiders
would be willing to disclose that have engaged in a self-dealing transaction.
Nor is it realistic to expect directors to declare that a transaction that they
have approved is in fact unfair to the corporation. The cases recognize this
as well. For example, in Popkin v. Bishop"' the Second Circuit observed:
In many, if not most, corporate self-dealing transactions touching
securities, state law does not demand prior shareholder approval.
In those situations, it makes sense to concentrate on the impro-
priety of the conduct itself rather than on the "failure to disclose"
it because full and fair disclosure in a real sense will rarely occur."
Even if it were otherwise appropriate to require that such information
be disclosed, it may well be difficult, if not impossible, for a person to judge
objectively whether or not he is a victim of divided loyalties, or whether
the transaction in question is fair or unfair. Indeed, such a test might even
backfire. For example, assuming insiders were required to give their opin-
ions as to the fairness of a transaction to the corporation, a statement to
that effect would be indisputable since it is only an opinion." The problem,
of course, is that this kind of requirement is purely subjective and is not
capable of consistent or predictable application. Judge Friendly appar-
ently recognized this fact in his opinion in Goldberg:
We do not mean to suggest that § 10(b) or 10b-5 requires insiders
to characterize conflict of interest transactions with pejorative
nouns or adjectives. However, if Maritimecor was in the parlous
financial condition alleged in the opposing affidavit of plaintiff's
counsel, a disclosure of the acquisition of Maritimecor that omit-
ted these facts would be seriously misleading.87
If an objective standard is chosen, then it must be one which requires
disclosure of all material facts surrounding a transaction where conflicts
"1 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 719.
"See, e.g., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 446 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In Biesenbach the
plaintiffs alleged that "the individual defendants at all times represented to the shareholders
that the transactions were in the best interests of the shareholders and [the corporation]".
Id. at 99. Is this a misrepresentation? Arguably it could not be since it constitutes an opinion.
Perhaps it could be considered a misrepresentation if the court found that no reasonable
person would have entertained an opinion that the corporation's best interests were served
by the transaction.
97 567 F.2d at 218 n.8. See also Golub v. PPD Corp., 576 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1978) (defen-
dants not required under Rule 10b-5 to disclose the "true motivation" behind a transaction);
Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977) (no duty
to disclose conflicts of interest or unfairness of a transaction); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976) (controlling shareholder "has the obligation to disclose to
the other stockholders information in its possession which reflects on the fairness of the
transaction").
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of interest exist. According to the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc.," facts would be material "if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [them] important in
deciding how to vote."89 In Northway, this test of materiality was applied
to the nondisclosure of the facts of a transaction that required shareholder
approval under state law. In Goldberg, however, were it not for the conflict
of interest, the responsibility for deciding the matter in question would
devolve upon the board of directors alone. Consequently, it is somewhat
incongruous in these kinds of cases to define materiality in terms of signifi-
cance to a reasonable shareholder. Judge Friendly in Goldberg foresaw the
conceptual problem and modified the materiality test in the following
manner:
When, as in a derivative action, the deception is alleged to have
been practiced on the corporation, even though all the directors
were parties to it, the test must be whether the facts that were not
disclosed or were misleadingly disclosed to the shareholders
"would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations" of
reasonable and disinterested directors or created "a substantial
likelihood" that such directors would have considered the "total
mix" of information available to have been "significantly al-
tered." 0
The Goldberg standard does present difficulties, conceptual and other-
wise. If the shareholders are the parties entitled to disclosure pursuant to
this new federal duty, then should not materiality be defined in terms of
a reasonable shareholder? For example, the fact that the majority of di-
rectors are nominees of a controlling shareholder may well be considered
significant to independent shareholders. It may demonstrate to them that
the recommendations of the board should not be accepted. On the other
hand, the mere existence of a conflict of interest on the part of many of
the board members may not so disturb an independent member of the
board of directors.
The issue of materiality is significant in yet another way. The very
definition of materiality presumes that the shareholder has an alternative
course of action.' If a shareholder is helpless to alter a given transaction
despite full disclosure, disclosure is immaterial and no federal liability
should be imposed. From a standpoint of state corporation law, disclosure
to a shareholder in conflict of interest cases should not result in liability
since state law gives the shareholder no voice in the matter. However, as
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
" Id. at 449.
0 567 F.2d at 219.
", If the transaction in question would occur despite the protest of an informed share-
holder, the fact that the shareholder had been misled or had not been informed would not
make a difference in the outcome. Thus, the information could never be considered
"material" to the outcome of the transaction. See Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
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the court in Goldberg observed, a shareholder, armed with the true facts
of a transaction, may be able to enjoin the transaction on behalf of the
corporation.2 To the extent a shareholder possesses such extra-corporate
remedies, the issue of materiality would appear to be satisfied.
The Seventh Circuit in Wright gave an additional wrinkle to the ques-
tion of materiality. Assuming, as was done in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.,"3 that proof of materiality will also establish reliance, the court in
Wright held that materiality would be presumed if the defendant could not
demonstrate that the transaction was fair to the corporation.4 This state-
ment is puzzling because it seems to fly directly in the face of Mills where
the Supreme Court rejected fairness as an appropriate test of reliance
under the proxy rules on the ground that a determination of fairness
would bypass shareholder prerogatives. The Supreme Court found this
objectionable because it reduced the importance of shareholder suffrage. 5
Moreover, from a conceptual standpoint, it is not clear that fairness could
ever be a valid consideration under a disclosure standard. Either informa-
tion is disclosed fully and adequately or it is not. After Mills, it must be
asked whether an after-the-fact judicial determination of fairness can ever
be an acceptable substitute for full disclosure. Directors may be faced with
several alternatives, all of which are fair to the corporation. Likewise the
fairness of the transaction may be only one of several elements to be
weighed by the board in choosing a course of action. Finally, fairness can
be viewed in several contexts. Transactions may be fair in some'respects
but not in others, or fair in the long run but unfair in the immediate
future." Therefore, the fairness analysis adopted in Wright appears unsup-
portable from the combined standpoints of precedent, logic and experi-
ence.
32 567 F.2d at 219.
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
' In Wright the Seventh Circuit characterized the directors' burden of proof as follows:
Thus ... in a 10b-5 action brought derivatively on behalf of the corporation by
minority shareholders to whom the self-dealing controlling shareholder failed to
make disclosure, if the controlling shareholder cannot demonstrate that the trans-
action is fair to the corporation, the requisite materially is shown and reliance is to
be presumed. The minority shareholders are thus afforded the same right they
would have had if full disclosure had been made, i.e., the right to obtain a judicial
determination of the fairness of a transaction forced upon the corporation by a
controlling shareholder with a conflict of interest. The existence of a causal link
between Heizer's technical violation of Rule 10b-5 and the consummation of the
pledge transaction depends, therefore, on the fairness of the transaction.
560 F. 2d at 250 [footnotes omitted].
,1 396 U.S. at 382-83.
" In one sense it might be argued that the fairness test of Wright is really quite similar
to Goldberg. In Goldberg, materiality, reliance and transaction causation is judged by the
impact of the misrepresented or undisclosed facts to a hypothetical independent director.
Presumably, such a director will only approve transactions that are fair to the corporation.
Hence, a finding of fairness may be viewed as a shortcut to the materiality test of Goldberg.
One must ask, however, if it is appropriate to assume that directors will only approve fair
transactions. "Fairness" in this sense is by no means synonymous with "most profitable,"
clearly a concern of any director.
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Closely related to the question of what must be disclosed pursuant to
this new duty is the issue of how disclosures to shareholders should be
made. The courts have been silent regarding the method of disclosing the
material facts of a transaction. Since no shareholder approval is required
otherwise under state or federal law, no formal vehicle for making disclo-
sures to all shareholders presently exists. It might be suggested that a press
release would be the appropriate means of making disclosure in such situa-
tions. The problem with the press release is that it is not likely to reach
all shareholders. For that reason, an alternative suggestion would be to
require a mailing of the material information to all shareholders of record.
Clearly, this would be difficult for larger corporations although perhaps not
so for corporations with fewer than a thousand shareholders. Nonetheless,
because the duty of disclosure exists in favor of all independent sharehold-
ers, caution dictates a communication designed to reach all shareholders,
despite the potential cost involved.
A third related issue concerns when disclosure should be made. From
the shareholders' standpoint, for the disclosure to serve its intended pur-
pose, it must be made prior to the transaction in question. If a press release
is the disclosure vehicle, it might be appropriate to require such a press
release to precede the transaction in question by a specified minimum
period of time to insure the widest possible dissemination." But dissemina-
tion alone is not enough. There must also be a reasonable period of time
for the shareholder to act upon the information. Since no formal share-
holder action is required under state law, the expected response may be
the filing of a lawsuit to enjoin the transaction. If this is the expected
response of the shareholder, then time must be allowed for reaction to the
disclosure and for filing of the suit. From the standpoint of the insider who
has a duty to disclose, the timeliness of the disclosure may also involve the
question of ripeness. Information may well be material but for the fact that
it must be verified, and until it is verified the information may not be
considered ripe for disclosure."'
One of the more nagging concerns about imposing this wide ranging
duty to disclose is that of making the duty compatible with those transac-
tions which require urgent action by the board of directors. In such cases,
conflicts of interest may well exist but other factors may require that a
decision be made quickly. Disclosure to the shareholders may not be possi-
ble prior to the necessary director action. Should directors or insiders be
penalized for failing to make disclosure in such situations?
g" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit held that material information must
be disclosed in a manner sufficient to ensure its availability to the investing public. See also
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (when material information is available and ripe for publication the difficulties inher-
ent in formulating a release cannot overbear the accuracy of the statements contained
therein).
11 See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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Perhaps this problem could be solved by requiring directors to seek
ratification of the transaction. Although disgruntled shareholders who be-
lieve that directors have compromised their independent judgment and
have harmed the corporation in most cases will not be able to compel an
unscrambling of the transactions, in egregious cases ratification may be a
possibility. Similarly, in close corporations, to which this rule also applies,
a forced return to the status quo ante may cause only a slight disruption.
Significantly, it would make the shareholders aware of facts surrounding
a potential breach of duty by the directors and other insiders thus allowing
them to sue for damages if any harm occurred to the corporation. The
deterrent impact of this kind of subsequent disclosure may make it an
effective preventative measure. On the other hand, one might argue that
subsequent disclosure merely invites lawsuits against the insiders for an
admitted breach of duty under state law, and since the measure of dam-
ages may well be the same whether or not disclosure had been made, a
strong impetus exists not to disclose after the fact. Furthermore, if post-
transaction disclosure is made to the shareholders and the shareholders
ratify the transaction with full knowledge of the facts, this ratification
certainly would preclude those approving shareholders from bringing an
action. Finally, it would be appropriate to create a rule precluding even
those objecting shareholders from maintaining an action against the insi-
ders if the transaction is ratified by a majority of the independent share-
holders. Because ratification might have the effect of preventing any law-
suits against insiders for breach of duty, such a rule might encourage
disclosure in order to avoid liability.
3. Standards of Conduct
An analysis of the possible defenses available to insiders charged with
deceiving the independent shareholders depends initially upon an appre-
ciation for the fact that multiple standards of conduct are being used in
the imposition of this federal duty. It is the existence of a conflict of
interest, which may or may not be actionable under state law, that gives
rise to the duty of disclosure under federal law.
The interrelationship between fiduciary duty and deception causes
some conceptual difficulty in determining what defenses are available to
defendants charged with deception of independent shareholders. Defen-
dants charged with intentional deceit in connection with a securities trans-
action may offer proof of good faith as a defense. Also, nonrecklessness is
a defense to allegations of gross negligence or reckless disregard for the
truth in a Rule 10b-5 action.9 After Santa Fe, proof of fairness would seem
to be irrelevant as a defense to a claim of deception.10 However, the inno-
" See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Currently the circuits are split
as to whether recklessness is adequate to impose 10b-5 liability. 1977-1978 Securities Law
Developments-Rule 10b-5, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 821-32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Developments-Rule lOb-51.
10 430 U.S. at 478 (1977).
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vations of the courts in Goldberg and Wright have revived the issue of
fairness to some degree. According to Wright, proof of fairness of a transac-
tion negates materiality and reliance and thus constitutes an absolute
defense to liability under federal law.' °' Under the Goldberg rule, however,
when materiality depends upon the significance of the facts to a hypotheti-
cal independent director, proof of fairness may not have the same effect.
Judge Friendly focused upon the significance of the facts rather than the
substantive fairness of the transaction. 2 This interpretation is more con-
sistent with a deception theory.
In addition to the incongruity of imposing a fairness standard upon a
deception rationale, the Wright decision places the burden of proof upon
the defendant to establish fairness.' 3 In the final analysis, the task of
proving fairness is nearly impossible. In most cases, all that can be argued
is that the challenged transaction was entered into because there was no
alternative and that it was necessary to the corporation regardless of the
detriment that it caused.' 4 It is highly unlikely that a defense of fairness
would withstand proof that the directors benefitted from a transaction that
in some way injured the corporation.
The standard of conduct applicable in cases such as Goldberg is scien-
ter, which may conceivably range from intentional misrepresentation to
reckless disregard of the truth.' 5 If affirmative misrepresentations in fact
are made to the shareholders, the defendants should find little solace in
even a gross negligence standard since courts are likely to presume that
affirmative misrepresentations constitute more than mere negligence. On
the other hand, nondisclosure of material facts may not receive the same
harsh scrutiny from the courts. In any event, the existence of scienter,
however defined, is primarily a factual issue. To the extent that good faith
serves to vitiate allegations of scienter,16 insiders should be encouraged, in
all such self-dealing transactions, to seek the judgment of independent
appraisers, investment bankers, engineers and similar experts as to the
fairness of the transaction. In this sense a finding of fairness may be a
factor in avoiding 10b-5 liability. The fact that the board acted only after
such an opinion may negate a recklessness charge as well.'0
,o, See note 61 supra.
,02 567 F.2d at 218-19.
'° 560 F.2d at 250.
,01 Judge Traynor offered the argument that the inherent fairness of a transaction can
be established by evidence of good faith or compelling business purpose. Jones v. H.F. Ah-
manson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 114, 460 P.2d 464, 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 604 (1969). This
argument is more akin to a defense of necessity rather than fairness.
I See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See generally Floor, The Scien-
ter Requirement under Rule 10b-5 and Reliance on Advice of Counsel After Hochfelder, 12
NEw ENG. L. Rav. 191 (1976); Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L. J. 891 (1976); Developments-Rule 10b-
5, supra note 99 at 821.
,'o See Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate and
Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. Rlv. 1, 13-16, 126-34 (1976).
107 Id.
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D. Conclusion
It is undeniable that cases such as Schoenbaum and Goldberg demon-
strate the kinds of abuses which, without an innovative theory of disclo-
sure, would be beyond the scope of federal regulation. On the other hand,
the very conduct which forms the basis of a duty to disclose should in most
cases also give rise to a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary responsibil-
ity under state law. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a situation in which
facts deemed material for purposes of federal law would not also be central
to a breach of fiduciary duty under state law. This, of course, raises the
question whether concomitant relief in the federal courts is necessary or
desirable. It is important to recall the injunction of Justice White in Santa
Fe that important considerations of federalism may weigh heavily against
permitting a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.'0 One consideration is
whether it is necessary to imply a cause of action in order to fulfill the
congressional purpose, or whether the cause of action is traditionally rele-
gated to state law."09
One must ask, therefore, whether the purpose served by creating this
novel theory of disclosure is necessary to accomplish the congressional
objective. There is no clear answer. It might be suggested that the opinion
in Santa Fe is schizophrenic. On the one hand, the court makes the expan-
sive suggestion that Rule 10b-5 will be imposed upon breaches of fiduciary
duty that include "some element of deception"'' 0 and then cites the
Schoenbaum decision apparently with favor. On the other hand, the lan-
guage of Part IV of the Santa Fe opinion would tend toward an opposing
view. In the final analysis the creation of an elaborate theory of disclosure
in order to provide a federal remedy seems to be a rejection of the Supreme
Court's position in Cort v. Ash"' and Santa Fe. The potential burden
imposed upon corporate insiders under federal law makes the theory of
Goldberg inappropriate so long as a cause of action for the same conduct
exists at the state level.1
2
I. The SEC'S Response-Utilizing Santa Fe to Expand its Powers
On November 17, 1977 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
proposed a rule designed to regulate "going private" transactions."3 In
addition to requiring broad disclosure pertaining to the transaction, the
"1 430 U.S. at 478-79.
109 Id.
"10 Id.
M 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1,2 According to the Reporter's Revision of the text of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-3 (October
1, 1974) at 106, "The Ruckle-Schoenbaum doctrine-that knowledge even of all the directors
is not necessarily attributable to the corporate plaintiff-is codified in §1402(c)." See ALI
Federal Securities Code §1402(c), Tent. Draft No. 2 (March 1973). However, it is not clear
that the new duty of disclosure imposed by Goldberg is also included in the codification.
"' Proposed Rule §240.13e-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Rule 13e-3].
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rule would require that the transaction be fair to unaffiliated securityhold-
ers. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe, however, in effect declared that the
fairness of a going private transaction accomplished by a short-form
merger was not a matter of federal concern under Rule 10b-5.1" Given the
apparent aversion of the Supreme Court to the regulation of fairness under
Rule 10b-5, one wonders at the boldness of the SEC in attempting to
regulate the substantive fairness of all going private transactions. The
SEC's analysis that accompanied the proposed rule demonstrated the
Commission's sensitivity to the holding in Santa Fe as well as its precursor,
Cort v. Ash." 5 This part of the article reviews the content of the proposed
rule, the statutory authority upon which it is grounded, and its philosophi-
cal compatibility with the position adopted by the Supreme Court in Santa
Fe and other recent decisions.
A. The Proposed Rule
The proposed rule and related schedule which would be promulgated
under Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is identified as
Rule 13e-3. If adopted, the proposal would augment and implement the
present statutory provisions by providing "definitions, specific disclosure
and dissemination requirements, substantive regulatory protections and
particular antifraud provisions with respect to going private transac-
tions.""' The substantive provisions of Proposed Rule 13e-3 would be ap-
plied to a specific class of securities transactions referred to as "Rule 13e-
'" 430 U.S. at 478.
", 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In its release accompanying the proposed rule, the Commission
argued:
The language of Section 13(e) of the Exchange Act proscribes any purchase by a
Section 12 issuer and/or an affiliate of such issuer of any equity security of such
issuer which violates rules or regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant
to that section. Since the section delineates the category of issuer, the type of
purchase and the type of prescribed conduct relating to any such purchases by such
persons, the Commission believes, particularly in light of the present status of
remedies available under state law, that the implementation of the section through
the rulemaking proposed herein is consistent with Cort v. Ash.
Securities and Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-14185 (Nov. 17, 1977), reprinted in [1977] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,366 at 88,744 [hereinafter referred to as the "1977 Release"]. And, with
respect to the Santa Fe decision, the Commission stated:
In the most recent case in which the Supreme Court examined Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Court held that a majority
shareholder's alleged breach of fiduciary duty by effecting a short form merger
under the Delaware Corporation Law without any allegation of a material misrepre-
sentation or a material failure to disclose did not state a claim under that section
or rule. In so holding, the Court interpreted the language of Section 10(b) as giving
"no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipu-
lation or deception," but the Court intimated "no view as to the Commission's
authority to promulgate . . . rules under other sections of the Act" with respect to
going private transactions.
Id. at 88,742-43.
,"6 1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,735.
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3 transactions." Application would depend upon the kind of transaction,
e.g., purchase, tender offer, reorganization, reclassification, reverse stock
split, or similar transaction between an issuer and its affiliate,"' and the
effects that the transaction is likely to have. The proposed rule states that
the transaction must have "either a reasonable likelihood or purpose" of
producing any of several effects, including the delisting from a national
exchange, the termination of registration under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act and, in general, termination of the special rights and responsibilities
of a company whose securities are publicly traded."' In short, the defini-
tion is comprehensive enough to apply to all instances of going private.
Although the criteria primarily are objective, the "reasonable likelihood"
or "purpose" tests could create problems when the focus is on the
"purpose" aspect of the transaction. The use of these standards as alterna-
tives apparently means that a transaction described in the definition could
be challenged even if none of the specified effects occur. This challenge
would require a judicial determination as to the motives of the insiders of
the issuer. Since many going private transactions have several purposes,
these parties would be faced with a degree of uncertainty whenever one of
the included transactions took place.
Once a transaction falls within both parts of the outlined definition, the
substantive provisions of the proposed rule become applicable. In essence,
the substantive provisions declare that only those going private transac-
tions that (1) are "fair" to the unaffiliated securityholders, (2) comply with
the extensive disclosure and dissemination provisions of the section and,
(3) are not otherwise fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative will be above
scrutiny by the Commission." 9
The SEC's proposal, as anticipated, does not attempt to define the
amorphous fairness requirement. A note to one of the provisions, however,
sets forth several "considerations which may bear on the question of fair-
ness in particular situations.""'2 These nonexclusive considerations include
approval, after full disclosure, by a majority of disinterested directors or
unaffiliated shareholders, fairness of the consideration offered, and bene-
fits to be received by a controlling shareholder as compared to those re-
ceived by the corporation or unaffiliated securityholders.' 2' These and
"I Proposed Rule 13e-3(a)(4), note 113 supra.
Its Id.
' Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(1), note 113 supra.
l2 See 1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,747.
,' In detail, considerations bearing on the issue of fairness are:
(A) Whether the Rule 13e-3 transaction has been approved by a majority of the
unaffiliated securityholders after (1) delivery to such persons of a disclosure docu-
ment containing the information required by Rule 13e-3(e) or a fair and adequate
summary thereof; and (2) such persons have had a reasonable opportunity to con-
sider such information;
(B) Whether the considerations offered to unaffiliated securityholders for the se-
curities subject to the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair in light of such factors as, for
example, current market prices, historical market prices, net book value, going-
concern value, liquidation value, previous purchases disclosed in Item 1(f) of
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other indicia of fairness are key components of the SEC's proposal, and are
controversial on two grounds. First, it is unclear whether the SEC has the
statutory authority to regulate the substantive fairness of securities trans-
actions. Second, a fairness standard presumes that all unaffiliated share-
holders have an identical and overriding concern with the objective fair-
ness of the transaction. Not only is this a questionable assumption from a
behaviorial standpoint as was suggested in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 1, 2 but it also flies in the face of the philosophy of unfettered share-
holder suffrage long espoused by both Congress and the Court.'1
In addition to substantive regulation, the proposed rule imposes ex-
haustive disclosure requirements. It requires the filing of a "Rule 13e-3
Transaction Statement" to be filed on Schedule 13E-3.'2 The schedule in
turn requires detailed item-by-item disclosure of twenty-one items.'2 Fi-
nally, the proposed rule describes how the information required to be dis-
closed should be disseminated to securityholders.'26
Schedule 13E-3, and any report, opinion, or appraisal described in Item 10 of the
Schedule 13E-3;
(C) Whether a majority of sufficiently disinterested directors, if any, of the issuer
has voted to approve the transaction prior to (1) dissemination of the disclosure
document containing the information required by proposed Rule 13e-3(e) or a fair
and adequate summary thereof; and (2) any vote of unaffiliated securityholders of
the issuer with respect to the Rule 13e-3 transaction;
(D) Whether a representative of the unaffiliated securityholders who is indepen-
dent of the issuer and its affiliate has negotiated, and agreed to, the terms of the
Rule 13e-3 transaction;
(E) Whether the terms and conditions of the Rule 13e-3 transaction are fair to
unaffiliated securityholders in light of the terms and conditions of any offers made
by third parties for securities of the class which is the subject of the Rule 13e-3
transaction;
(F) The purpose of the Rule 13e-3 transaction;
(G) The anticipated benefits to be derived from the Rule 13e-3 transaction by the
issuer or affiliate, including consideration of the extent to which the issuer's funds
or other assets are used in connection with the Rule 13e-3 transaction, vis-a-vis
those to be derived by unaffiliated securityholders;
(H) The tax consequences likely to be incurred by unaffiliated securityholders of
the issuer as a result of the timing of the Rule 13e-3 transaction;
(I) Whether the Rule 13e-3 transaction complies with the requirements of applica-
ble laws and regulations of the state of incorporation of the issuer show securities
are the subject of the Rule 13e-3 transaction;
(J) In certain Rule 13e-3 transactions (such as those involving the purchase of the
equity securities of a subsidiary by its parent), whether the consideration offered
to the unaffiliated securityholders for the securities which are the subject of the
Rule 13e-3 transaction is comprised of securities of the surviving entity (such as the
parent) which would enable such unaffiliated securityholders to maintain an equity
interest in the continuing business enterprise.
Proposed Rule 13e-3(b), supra note 113, at 60,101.
'- 296 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970). See also ABA Committee on the Federal Regulation of
Securities, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Comment Letter (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Committee Comment Letter].
121 Proposed Rule 13e-3(d) note 113 supra.
'2 396 U.S. at 382 n.5; J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 337 U.S. 426 (1964).
121 Proposed Rule 13e-3(d) note 114 supra.
'2 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1978).
' Proposed Rule 13e-3(f), note 113 supra.
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The disclosure requirements prompt a significant inquiry. Is the SEC
improperly attempting, through the imposition of burdensome disclosure
provisions, to discourage going private transactions? Arguably, the Com-
mission has exceeded the permissible boundaries for requiring disclosure
by employing disclosure requirements as a means of regulating substantive
corporate conduct rather than merely achieving equality of information on
both sides of a securities transaction. 21 It might also be noted that the
proposed disclosure requirements will often be duplicative of other disclo-
sure provisions of the Exchange Act.
28
B. Statutory Authority for the Proposed Rule
If the proposed rule is promulgated by the SEC, it probably will be
challenged as beyond the scope of the Commission's statutory rulemaking
authority. Such a challenge will be particularly important because the
proposal represents the first attempt to regulate the fairness of a securities
transaction under the 1934 Act.'
' In a recent report by the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, the Committee
recommended that "[the Commission should not use disclosure solely to regulate corporate
conduct unless expressly authorized to do so by the Congress." Disclosure Study Report,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,300, at 88,483 (Sept. 8, 1977).
118 Obviously, any time a going private transaction involves a merger or tender offer,
compliance with various disalosure provisions of Section 14 of the Exchange Act will be
required.
In The 1977 proposal, however, is not the first proposal put forth by the Commission to
regulate going private. In Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975), the SEC announced that it had ordered a public fact-finding
investigation and rulemaking proceeding in the matter of going private transactions. The
rules proposed in the 1975 release were delineated as Proposed Rule 13e-3A and Proposed Rule
13e-3B, and were intended to be alternative methods of regulating going private transactions.
Although the 1975 proposals presented basically the same definitional provisions as those in
the 1977 proposed rule, the 1975 rules differed in the manner in which they regulated going
private transactions. In addition to disclosure and dissemination requirements similar to
those required by the 1977 proposals, Proposed Rule 13e-3A was concerned primarily with the
consideration to be transferred to unaffiliated securityholders, requiring, for example, that
the price "be no lower than that recommended jointly by two qualified independent persons."
Proposed Rule 13e-3A(c)(2). The appraisers were required to submit reports regarding the
basis for their recommendation, and these reports or a summary were to be disseminated to
securityholders. Proposed Rule 13e-3B, by contrast, involved more substantive regulation in
addition to disclosure requiring a "valid business purpose" for entering into the transaction,
including that any consideration paid to any securityholder be fair. Proposed Rule 13e-3B(a).
An appraisal was not mandatory under Proposed Rule 13e-3B.
Another interesting contrast between the 1975 and 1977 proposals is the apparent change
in the SEC attitude. In 1975, the SEC included in its release statements that indicated the
tentative nature of the proposals:
In announcing this proceeding, the Commission does not wish its position to be
misunderstood. The phenomenon of "going private" is important and raises signifi-
cant questions of investor protection which should be thoroughly explored . . ..
The Commission, however, has reached no conclusions with respect to the proposed
rules. They are included to provide a framework for the hearing and comments.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. Szc. L. REP.
(CCH) 80,104 at 85,090 (1975).
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Although the SEC refers to several sections of the securities laws as
providing statutory authority, the primary basis for the proposed rule is
Section 13(e).111 In its contention that Section 13(e) provides the statutory
authority to regulate the substance of a going private transaction, the
Commission has demonstrated its awareness of and sensitivity to Santa Fe
and other recent Burger Court securities decisions. In its proposal, the
Commission adopted the methodology of those decisions and emphasized
the crucial nature of the precise statutory language as well as the legisla-
tive history. Then, in a fashion similar to that of Santa Fe and Hochfelder,
the Commission set out to justify a more expansive reading of Section 13(e)
than that given to Section 10(b) by those decisions. Emphasizing Section
13(e)'s inclusion of the word "fraudulent," the SEC declared:
While Section 10(b) speaks in terms of "manipulative or decep-
tive," Section 13(e) refers to "fraudulent," "deceptive" or
"manipulative". Thus, Section 13(e) speaks specifically in terms
of fraudulent acts and practices. The language of Section 13(e)
explicitly vests authority in the Commission to adopt rules and
regulations to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts and practices in
connection with a purchase by a Section 12 issuer or a purchase
by an affiliate of such issuer of any equity security of such issuer.
The specific language of and the rulemaking authority conferred
by Section 13(e), which was part of legislation intended by Con-
gress to close a gap in the Federal securities laws, is in sharp
contrast to that of Section 10(b) which is directed at the purchase
or sale of any security. 3'
Thus, in attempting to avoid the Santa Fe decision, the SEC has based
its argument for statutory authority on the inclusion of the word
In contrast, the 1977 release contains no exculpatory language, declaring instead:
The Commission proposes for comment a new rule and related schedule relating to
going private transactions by public companies or their affiliates. If adopted, these
proposals would provide definitions, specific disclosure dissemination require-
ments, substantive regulatory protections and particular antifraud provisions with
respect to going private transactions. These proposals are necessary and appropri-
ate in the public interest and for the protection of investors ....
1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,735.
In one sense, it could be expected that after two years in which to assess the impact of
the going private phenomenon and the proposed rules, the Commission would be more certain
of its position. Nonetheless, the boldness of the SEC in the 1977 release is noteworthy in light
of Santa Fe.
Further evidence of the Commission's bold approach is its recommendation in the 1977
release that "should proposed Rule 13e-3 be adopted, it would be appropriate for the courts
to construe its provisions in such a way as to imply a private right thereunder." Id. at 88,753.
The ABA Committee Comment Letter attacks this suggestion as "unprecedented and inap-
propriate." $ee ABA Committee Comment Letter, supra note 122, at 26. The Commission
appears to be trying to encourage the courts to give great weight to the administrative gloss
it has provided.
'"1 1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,740-44.
'3, Id. at 88.743.
[Vol. XXXV
RESPONSES TO SANTA FE
"fraudulent" in Section 13(e) and the accompanying legislative history of
the Williams Act. The crucial inquiry, then, is whether these two consider-
ations support such broad expansion of the Commission's regulatory reach.
The SEC relied upon the legislative history of the Williams Act in
general and of Section 13(e) in particular for the proposition that the
provisions of the Williams Act were intended to correct a "gap" in the
federal securities laws and that the SEC was not restricted solely to impos-
ing disclosure requirements.'32 A close examination of the legislative his-
tory of the Williams Act reveals, however, that Congress never explicitly
intended the legislation to permit substantive regulation. Instead, much
of the controversy seems to have been centered on whether there was a
need for any regulation at all. For example, the oft-quoted language that
Section 13(e) was intended to fill a "current gap" in the securities laws is
part of a Senate Report that stated:
The bill would correct the current gap in our securities laws by
amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for full
disclosure in connection with cash tender offers and other tech-
niques for accumulating large blocks of equity securities of pub-
licly held companies.'33
This quotation clarifies that the "gap" Congress intended to close related
to types of transactions theretofore not covered by the 1934 Act rather than
grant to the Commission the power to engage in substantive regulation.
As originally drafted, the bill gave the SEC rulemaking authority be-
yond merely prohibiting fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive practices.
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance,
then SEC Chairman Cohen outlined the broad powers granted in the bill.
The provisions of this bill would make it unlawful for an issuer to
purchase its own securities in contravention of rules or regulations
which the Commission adopts because they are necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest, or to protect investors, irrespective of
the question, whether, or our ability to prove that, such activity is
or may be fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.134
Significantly, the House Committee altered the bill and amended Section
13(e)(1) to clarify that the Commission's rules were intended by Congress
"solely (A) to define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means reasonably designed to pre-
vent such acts and practices."' 35 Thus, the Williams Act, as passed, was
narrower than originally drafted and seems to have limited the SEC's
rulemaking authority to that traditionally provided in the antifraud provi-
sions.
132 Id.
'3 S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., lt Sess. 4 (1967) (emphasis added).
'3 Hearing on H.R. 14,475 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1968).
'l H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968).
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Finally, in its 1977 release the Commission treats the term
"fraudulent" as if it were imbued with a special meaning that extends
beyond deception and manipulation to include conduct that is oppressive
or unfair. 3 ' While equity traditionally has given such an expansive inter-
pretation to the term,'37 the Supreme Court has given no indication that
it finds such an interpretation appropriate under the securities laws. In-
deed, in Santa Fe, the Court analyzed the meaning of term "fraud" in Rule
10b-5 only in terms of deception or manipulation'3 and rejected an inter-
pretation of fraud that reaches beyond the statutory language of Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. 39 This suggests that the Supreme Court is not likely
to agree with the SEC's view of the term "fraudulent."1 0
C. The Relationship Between Santa Fe and the 1977 Proposed Rule
The Supreme Court's statutory analysis in Santa Fe presented three
guiding principles for the interpretation of the scope of antifraud rules
promulgated by the SEC. First, the reach of the federal securities laws and
regulations extends no further than the express statutory language and
legislative history allow. Second, when the statute and history are incon-
clusive, courts must be guided by the fundamental purpose of the federal
securities laws-full disclosure.' Fairness in securities transactions is "at
most a tangential concern .... "4 Third, absent clear statutory direc-
tion, considerations of federalism must be factored into a decision whether
to expand the reach of federal securities laws into areas traditionally regu-
lated by state corporation laws.
As discussed previously, the SEC was fully aware of the thrust of the
Santa Fe decision when it issued the proposed rule. Indeed, the analysis
of the proposal presented by the Commission cites specifically to the hold-
ing.' Although the difference in language between Section 10(b) and Sec-
tion 13(e) prevents the direct application of Santa Fe, the Commission
deftly utilizes the Court's dependence upon statutory language to con-
struct an argument for an expansive reading of Section 13(e) to justify its
"1 1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,742.
13' In Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889) the Supreme Court described the term
"fraud" broadly:
Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions
and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or con-
fidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or an
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
"' See 430 U.S. at 472. It should be noted also that in Blue Chip the majority described
Section 10(b) as prohibiting "fraud" even though the section refers only to deception and
manipulation. See 421 U.S. at 733. This suggests that the Court considered "fraud" under
the securities laws to have a limited meaning.
13' 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970).
110 See, e.g. Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,506
(W.D. Mich. July 19, 1978).
"I Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
142 Id.
"1 1977 Release, supra note 115, at 88,742.
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going private rule. To this extent, the Commission's methodology is wholly
consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis. However, in attempting to
create a federal fairness standard, the SEC has disregarded the ability of
the states to regulate going private transactions, and breaks with the Santa
Fe rationale.
In the final analysis, the Santa Fe opinion and the proposed going
private rule cannot be effectively compared and contrasted on the basis of
statutory language or congressional intent. Rather the issue is one of phi-
losophy. While the SEC has borrowed the analysis of the Santa Fe decision
to buttress its position that Section 13(e) must be read broadly, the pro-
posed rule is not consistent with the philosophical underpinnings of the
decision. This incompatability suggests that if the rule becomes final and
is challenged, the Court would be inclined to follow its recent trend in
restricting the scope of the federal securities laws and invalidate the rule.
IV. Conclusion
The position of the Supreme Court seemed unmistakably clear in the
Santa Fe opinion. Drawing from the authority of Hochfelder and other
recent decisions, the court presented both legal and jurisprudential argu-
ments for restricting the scope of Rule 10b-5. Indeed, after presenting a
clear and quite convincing argument that the express terms of Section
10(b) and the legislative history would not permit a federal remedy for
breaches of fiduciary duty, the Court, almost gratuitously, stated that
principles of federalism also mandated a limitation on the spread of federal
regulation into an area customarily the subject of state law. Despite this
rather forceful statement, however, neither the federal courts nor the SEC
have been willing to accept Santa Fe as dispositive of any and all federal
regulation of fiduciary duties and fairness. The rule adopted in the Second
and Seventh Circuits, while ostensibly labeled as a type of deception, is
really grounded in state law fiduciary duty concepts. In fact, but for such
a breach of duty, no corresponding federal obligation to disclbse to inde-
pendent shareholders would be created. The Commission's proposed rule
at least enjoys the distinction of resting upon another section of the securi-
ties laws. Even so, the effort by the SEC to regulate fairness seems to
conflict directly with Santa Fe's rejection of such regulation as a federal
concern. In the long run, neither the federal courts' interpretation nor the
Commission's rulemaking effort may survive, not because they are without
merit, but because they seek to impose a federal solution to what the
Supreme Court in Santa Fe recognized as solely a matter of state concern.
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